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CORPORATIONS-SHAREHOLDERS-POWER OF THE MAJORITY TO RATIFY DI-
RECTORS' FRAUD-Plaintiff, a stockholder in the Kroger Company, brought a 
derivative suit against a subsidiary of the company and certain officers 
and directors of both the parent and the subsidiary. It was alleged that 
. Kroger's directors had fraudulently waived the company's preemptive right 
to a new issue of stock of the subsidiary and had then purchased the shares 
for their own accounts at a price far below the market value. The defend-
ants answered that the sale had been ratified by a majority in interest of 
disinterested stockholders to whom all the details of the transaction had 
been explained, and denied plaintiff's right to bring a derivative suit 
without first having made a demand on the stockholders to take remedial 
action. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the court of appeals 
affirmed, holding that although a majority could not ratify a director's 
fraud over the objection of any of the stockholders, the plaintiff neverthe-
less lacked standing to sue without having made a prior demand on the 
stockholders. On appeal, held, affirmed as modified, one judge dissenting. 
A demand on the stockholders was a prerequisite to bringing the suit, 
because a majority in interest of the stockholders have the power to ratify 
the director's fraud so long as the ratification is by disinterested stock-
holders and there is no fraud in obtaining their vote. Claman v. Robert-
son, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E. (2d) 429 (1955). 
The courts have long recognized the power of a majority in interest 
of the stockholders to determine corporate policy1 but have not allowed 
1 Barnes v. Brown, 80 N.Y. 5Zl (1880); Gaines v. Gaines Bros. Co., 176 Okla. 583, 56 
P. (2d) 863 (1936). 
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them to enrich themselves fraudulently at the expense of the minority.2 
Somewhere in between these two positions falls the problem presented by 
the principal case. In the leading case of Continental Securities Co. v. 
Belmont3 the New York Court of Appeals held that a director's fraud can 
be ratified only by a unanimous vote of the stockholders. In so holding, 
the New York court distinguished contrary English authority,4 but on 
somewhat questionable grounds.5 Although this non-ratification rule has 
found support in other courts,6 tlie strength of this support is diminished 
in so far as the rule has been invoked to decide cases in which the majority 
stockholders themselves were participants in the fraud and profited from 
it.7 While only two American cases have been found which directly support 
the view of the principal case,8 the doctrine of majority ratification appears 
to be the better view. It seems unreasonable to fear that adoption of this 
· doctrine will encourage dishonesty on the part of corporate directors. 
Stockholders are not prone to ratify acts of directors which constitute a 
fraud on the corporation. And since ratification is a defense to the deriva-
tive suit, it would be necessary to establish clearly that the ratification was 
effectuated by fully informed stockholders who were not in any way impli-
cated in the fraud. Adoption of this doctrine would avoid the inflexibility 
of the non-ratification rule, which prevents ratification even when sound 
business judgment would indicate that it is the wisest policy for the corpo-
ration to follow.9 In addition, it would discourage suits by "strikers," 
2 Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 39 S.Ct. 533 (1919); Klein v. Inde-
pendent Brewing Assn., 231 Ill. 594, 83 N .E. 434 (1908). 
3206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912). 
4 Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (1843). 
5 The New York court interpreted Foss v. Harbottle, note 4 supra, to mean simply 
that a stockholder could not bring a derivative suit without making a prior demand on 
the stockholders for remedial action. The court said that this did not apply in the case 
of a director's fraud since such a fraud could never be ratified except by a unanimous 
vote of the shareholders. This interpretation is questionable since the English court 
stated that it would assume a wrong had been committed against the company by the 
directors, and then went on to deny plaintiff's standing to sue on the basis that any 
decree issued by the court would be nullified if a majority in interest of the stockholders 
ratified the acts. 
6 Pollitz v. Wabash R. Co., 207 N.Y. 113, 100 N.E. 721 (1912); Dana v. Morgan, (D.C. 
N.Y. 1914) 219 F. 313, affd. (2d Cir. 1916) 232 F. 85; Eshleman v. Keenan, 21 Del. Ch. 
259, 187 A. 25 (1936); Chounis v. Laing, 125 W.Va. 275, 23 S.E. (2d) 628 (1942). 
7 Goodin v. Cincinnati & Whitewater Canal Co., 18 Ohio St. 169 (1868); Ford v. Ford 
Roofing Products Co., (Mo. App. 1926) 285 S.W. 538. See 53 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1368 (1940). 
8 Kessler v. Ensley Co., (D.C. Ala. 1904) 129 F. 397; Mountain States Packing Co. v. 
Curtis, 86 Colo. 355, 281 P. 737 (1929). See also S. Solomont and Sons Trust v. New Eng-
land Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E. (2d) 241 (1950), wherein the court 
affirmed the non-ratification rule enunciated in prior Massachusetts cases, but went on 
to say that, although there could be no ratification of a director's fraud over the objec-
tion of any of the stockholders, the majority in interest of the stockholders did have the 
power to decide whether or not the corporation should sue the directors. Although the 
court said this was a distinction of substance rather than form, it is clear that allowing 
the majority stockholders to decide to forego suit effectively emasculates the non-ratifica-
tion rule in Massachusetts. See 64 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 334 (1950). 
9 For a discussion of the reasons which oould make ratification of a director's fraudu-
lent act desirable, see Kessler v. Ensley, note 8 supra. 
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holders of a small number of shares who are more interested in the large 
settlements sometimes made by corporations than they are in the welfare 
of the business.10 Legislation designed to prevent some of these abuses by 
"strikers"11 has been severely criticized12 since it tends to make it difficult 
£or any small stockholder to bring a derivative suit, regardless of the nature 
of the cause of action. Allowing a minority stockholder to bring an action 
which is opposed by the honest judgment of the majority stockholders 
would increase the need for this type of restrictive legislation. On the 
other hand, adoption of the doctrine of ratification leaves control of corpo-
rate policies in the owners of the corporation. In this manner the persons 
who have the most to gain by wise corporate policies will be the ones who 
will decide whether it is in the best interests of the corporation to assert 
its legal rights. This is a decision which is better left to the stockholders 
than to the courts. 
Paul A. Heinen 
10 The extent to which the stockholders' derivative suit has been abused is discussed 
in Woon, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE Suns, Special Com-
mittee on Corporate Litigation of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York 
(1944). 
11 The New York law, the first of this type, provides that unless a stockholder owns 
shares which either exceed fifty thousand dollars in market value or constitute over five 
percent of the total outstanding shares, the corporation may require him to give security 
for the reasonable expenses which may be incurred by the corporation in defending the 
suit, including attorney's fees, before he can maintain his action. 22 N.Y. Consol. Laws 
(McKinney, 1943; Supp. 1955) §61-b. As examples of substantially similar statutes, see 
N.J. Stat. Ann. (1939; Supp. 1955) tit. 14, §14:3-15; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1953) tit. 
12, §1322. 
12 Hornstein, "New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits," 47 CoL. L. REv. I 
(1947); Zlinkoff, "The American Investor and the Constitutionality of Section 61-B of 
the New York General Corporation Law,'' 54 YALE L.J. 352 (1945). 
